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Abstract: In this paper I pursue the question whether transcendental 
explanation in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre should be regarded as ontologically 
committed. It is natural to assume that transcendental explanation in the 
Wissenschaftslehre should be construed non-ontologically: Schulze's 
criticisms of Kantian philosophy and Jacobi's objection to philosophical 
justification supply Fichte with motives for freeing transcendental explanation 
of ontological commitment. However, the situation is not, I argue, clear-cut: 
Fichte's explicit remarks are equivocal and exhibit tensions, and 
interpretations of the WL which imply its non-ontological status are open to 
criticism. Finally I suggest a way in which Fichte's position on the WL’s 
status may be regarded as coherent and defensible, and indicate how the 
relation of Fichte to Schelling and Hegel may be understood in its light. 
 
1.  Inverting the form of philosophical explanation  
 
A firm majority of commentators would reject the suggestion that the German 
idealists offer metaphysical explanations of the same order as those offered by, say, 
the rationalists. On the contrary, the notion that, whatever continuities there may be, 
there is a deep difference of status between German idealist metaphysics and 
traditional, pre-Kantian metaphysics, is a commonplace. Equally commonplace is the 
thought that the German idealists were engaged in attempting to define and employ a 
new form of philosophical explanation, which does not consist simply in a 
reapplication without alteration of the philosophical methods showcased in the first 
Critique. A third notion often encountered is that what the German idealists were 
aiming to do was not to affirm or postulate another world different from and 
additional to this one, but to redescribe this world: they were attempting “to articulate 
an alternative vision of reality − and not a vision of some alternative reality.”1 
 These claims are brought together in the idea that the German idealists, in 
furnishing their redescriptions of this world, invert the form of philosophical 
explanation employed in common sense and pre-Copernican philosophy, with the 
result that, from the ordinary or the pre-Kantian standpoint, the explanation they offer 
for this world appears to be an image of it in inverted form.2 The German idealists 
themselves employ the idea of inverting common sense. Fichte declares that he is 
“concerned with the complete reversal [die völlige Umkehrung]” of ordinary and pre-
Kantian ways of thinking,3 for which reason the Wissenschaftslehre is necessarily 
understood from the ordinary standpoint as saying the opposite of what it in fact 
                                                     
1 Bell, 2001, p. 177. Bell describes this as “the goal of a transcendental theory” in general, not only of 
German idealism. 
2 See, e.g., Kuehn, 1987, pp. 11-12. 
3 Fichte, 1797a, p. 5 [FW I, 421]. 
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says.4 Similarly, Schelling says that “transcendental idealism arises in general 
through the direct inversion [die gerade Umkehrung] of previous modes of 
philosophical explanation.”5 And the aim of world-inversion is affirmed explicitly by 
Schelling and Hegel in their Introduction to the Kritisches Journal: 
 
[philosophy] only is philosophy in virtue of being directly opposed to the 
understanding and hence even more opposed to healthy common sense, under 
which label we understand the limitedness in space and time of a race of men; 
in its relationship to common sense the world of philosophy is in and for itself 
an inverted world [eine verkehrte Welt].6 
 
 My aim here is to examine a dimension of German idealism which is not often 
highlighted as such, namely the way in which German idealism breaks with the 
understanding of the relation between explanation and ontology found in common 
sense and traditional metaphysics. The question of the ontological status of the 
grounds adduced in philosophical explanation is, I will try to show, a central, abiding 
issue in the German idealists’ formulation of their positions and in the arguments 
between them, and the positions which the German idealists take up in their attempt 
to solve the deep problem which, they correctly see, surrounds this question, are part 
of what makes German idealist thinking difficult to grasp from, and apparently 
opposed to, the standpoint of common sense. Limitations of space make it impossible 
to discuss more than the earlier part of the story − Fichte’s wrestling with the problem 
of ontological status − but I will indicate at the end how the issue extends beyond 
Fichte to Schelling and Hegel. 
 
2.  Ontological and Non-Ontological conceptions of philosophical explanation 
 
As a framework for the discussion, I will employ a distinction between two rival 
conceptions of the source and form of philosophical explanation, the Ontological and 
the Non-Ontological, which are to be understand in the following terms.7 
 On the conception which is most natural to us, explanation is an ontological 
matter: to explain something is, very roughly, to link up one part of reality in the 
appropriate way with another part. Correspondingly, the Ontological conception of 
philosophical explanation holds that philosophical explanation must of necessity 
terminate in a claim with ontological force, and that the explanatory force of a 
philosophical proposition derives from the piece of reality which it discloses. On this 
conception, therefore, what it is to account philosophically for something is to track 
                                                     
4 E.g. Fichte, 1797b, p. 86 [FW I, 500-1], where Fichte says that the WL’s assertion that one cannot 
abstract from the I appears from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness to mean that “we never 
entertain any representation but that of ourselves.” See also Fichte, 1801, pp. 85-7 [FW II, 382-4], and 
1806, pp. 367-8. 
5 Schelling, 1800, p. 168 (translation modified) [SW II, 548]. 
6 Hegel and Schelling, 1802, p. 283 [SW III, 521; HW II, 182]. 
7 On this distinction, see Sacks, 2000, esp. chs. 6 and 9. My understanding of the issue is indebted 
heavily to this work and to Sacks’ earlier 1989. 
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relations obtaining between grounded (consequential, derivative, etc.) and grounding 
(antecedent, basic, etc.) items among or features of what exists. 
 The opposing, Non-Ontological conception of philosophical explanation 
affirms the proper distinctness of philosophical explanation and ontological assertion, 
maintaining that the explanatory force of philosophical claims should not be 
identified with the matter of something’s having being. While this leaves open how in 
positive terms philosophical explanation should be conceived, in the post-Kantian 
transcendental context, the intelligibility of Non-Ontological explanation is bound up 
with the concept of perspective, understood in a special philosophical sense. 
Perspective in the transcendental sense is adduced as the ground of there being a 
domain of objects for a subject: perspective is what delivers and forms objects, and 
objects are “marked” by perspective in the sense that they refer back to it as the 
condition under which they are given, perspective itself being nothing more than an 
object-grounding, form-bestowing function, which could not be discharged if 
perspective were given in the same way as the objects that it grounds.8 The 
transcendental concept of perspective, on the Non-Ontological conception, differs 
from the ordinary concept of an individual’s subjective, first-person point of view, in 
so far as perspective is prised apart from the ontological facts on which ordinary 
consciousness regards points of view as supervening. These facts include the 
existence of a subject whose constitution would, on ordinary, Ontological ways of 
thinking, be held to provide the explanation of perspective. In this way perspective 
becomes autonomous: because the ontological domain is internal to perspective, 
perspective itself is without ontological status – no ontological hinterland lies behind 
our backs. What philosophy does therefore, on this conception, is to give us in 
discursive form the perspective within which the existing world appears: the relation 
between the perspective, and the world given in it, is a relation of explanation or 
grounding; the existing world is the explanandum, perspective the explanans; final 
philosophical explanation, and the articulation of perspective, are one and the same. 
From the standpoint of common sense, the Non-Ontological conception appears as a 
dizzying attempt to ground the real on the unreal, quite deserving the description of 
an “inversion” of reality. 
 The commitment of a philosophical position to either an Ontological or a 
Non-Ontological conception of philosophical explanation, it should be noted, is 
distinct from its commitment to either idealism or realism, in so far as the 
(metaphilosophical) question of the (ontological or non-ontological) status of the 
grounds of philosophical explanation is different from the (metaphysical) question of 
the (ideal or real) status of the objects of cognition.9 
                                                     
8 See the helpful remarks on the concept of point of view in Moore, 1997, pp. 6-14. 
9 Which is not to deny the obvious affinity between Non-Ontological explanation and transcendental 
idealism; the Non-Ontological metaphilosophical view is furthermore one candidate for an 
identification of the true meaning of transcendental idealism. But whether this identification – and the 
converse identification of Ontological explanation with transcendental realism – goes through, depends 
on how things develop: on how transcendental idealism is interpreted, on whether “perspective” is 
understood as necessarily just the perspective of a subject, and so on. As I have drawn the distinction, 
the Non-Ontological conception is logically compatible with the claim that the objects of cognition are 
(in at least some sense of the term) transcendentally real. 
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 This is not the place to consider the logic of these two positions on their own 
account. Yet, to anticipate some of what will emerge later, it is not hard to see what 
sort of dialectic results when these two conceptions of philosophical explanation 
confront one another in the post-Kantian context, and even how they may come to be 
regarded as forming a kind of antinomy. The Non-Ontological conception will meet 
the objection that, if perspective is adduced as the ultimate term of philosophical 
explanation, then some sort of ontological status must be attributed to it, if only 
implicitly, without which philosophical explanation will have merely subjective 
status and the perspective it articulates will amount to nothing more than a mere 
unanchored representation; while to the Ontological conception it will be objected 
that, to take the mere fact of the existence of anything, whatever it may be, as itself 
explanatory, apart from and outside a framework which allows us to understand 
ontological facts as explanatory and so which must itself have pre-ontological 
grounding status, is to collapse transcendental back into pre-transcendental 
explanation, and to reinstitute the skeptical gap which transcendental philosophy was 
meant to close, between facts of existence and our claims to knowledge of them. 
 
3.  The background to Fichte: Kant, Schulze, Jacobi 
 
The notion that Fichte, in radicalising Kant and shifting Critical philosophy onto a 
practical basis, frees transcendental explanation of ontological commitment, 
obviously has much to recommend it, and it corresponds to the view of a number of 
commentators;10 the contrast of Fichte with Schelling, viewed as re-ontologising that 
which Fichte had de-ontologised, is often drawn in these terms. In this section I want 
to consider how the issue of the ontological commitment of philosophical explanation 
came to present itself to Fichte, and how Fichte’s understanding of the post-Kantian 
context furnished him with motives for taking the Non-Ontological turn. 
 1. Kant. There are several respects in which the ontological commitment of 
Kant’s philosophical claims appears uncertain, both of which came to the fore in 
early Kant reception and impressed themselves on Fichte. 
 (i) The first, clear locus of uncertainty is the transcendental theory of 
experience in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In connection with the wholly general 
problem concerning the thing in itself as ground of appearance, uncertainty 
concerning ontological commitment arises with respect to the subject adduced in 
transcendental explanation. There is a distinction to be drawn between (1) 
transcendental conditions in the logical sense, expressed by the relevant principles of 
possible experience, propositions asserting the necessity that objects be given and 
thought in certain ways (as in space, causally ordered, etc.); and (2) the intra-
subjective ontological structures on which, it may be thought, these conditions 
supervene and which provide the source of the agency of their realisation in 
experience, these structures being what is spoken of in Kant’s language of faculties or 
underpins Kant’s faculty explanations. The much disputed exegetical question here, 
                                                     
10 In addition to those discussed below in section 5, see di Giovanni, 2005, pp. 27-8 and 284-5, and W. 
Martin, 1997, e.g., pp. 12-15. 
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of course, concerns Kant’s commitment or lack of it to transcendental psychology 
or, it is better to say, the Ontological or Non-Ontological interpretation thereof.11 And 
this issue is bound up with a broader issue, concerning the scope remaining to Kant 
for existential assertion outside the bounds of possible experience: the one view being 
that the Transcendental Analytic eliminates, the other that it preserves (through the 
unschematised form of the categories of pure understanding) the thinkability of actual 
existence beyond the bounds of sensibility.12 The root of the tension lies in the fact 
that, on the one hand, Kant may be held to show that what it is for something to have 
or be known to have being is for it to stand under transcendental conditions, entailing 
that knowledge of transcendental conditions cannot be knowledge of anything that 
has existence. On the other hand, to the extent that Kant affirms an unknowable but 
necessarily thought realm of existing and grounding things in themselves, 
transcendental conditions may be thought of as ontologically grounded, and 
completeness of explanation appears to demand that we do so. 
 Now in the present context all that need be said is that it is plausible to regard 
Kant as intending to remain agnostic regarding the ontological underpinnings of 
transcendental conditions on the side of the subject, and consequently as not 
committing himself decisively either to an Ontological or to a Non-Ontological 
conception of philosophical explanation, a position which the relatively 
circumscribed or modest character of his philosophical project allows him to 
maintain: characterisation of the transcendental can remain relational and functional 
in Kant, its ontological status undetermined, because it is not taken as a foundation 
from which knowledge at the empirical level is to be derived. 
 (ii) The second, to us less obvious but for Fichte and his contemporaries no 
less important, locus of ontological uncertainty in Kant surrounds his account of the 
“practical cognition” of God achieved through the postulates of pure practical reason. 
Depending on how one understands Kant’s ascription of objective reality from the 
practical point of view, the moral theology either reveals in pure practical reason a 
power of sheer cognitive insight into supersensible reality, or it collapses the very 
semantics of religious discourse into the terms of finite human autonomy. The 
profound ambiguity of this part of Kant’s system is reflected in the fact that his moral 
theology could both be received as a new foundation for Christian doctrine, as it was 
by the theologians at Tübingen of whom Schelling complained in acid terms to 
Hegel, and be taken, as it was by Friedrich Karl Forberg, as a general blueprint for 
metaphysical fictionalism (of the sort we now associate with Hans Vaihinger’s as-if 
philosophy).13 This instance of Kantian ambiguity allows itself to be explained in the 
same way as that which attaches to transcendental conditions: Kant’s view is, 
plausibly, that we do not need to know, for the purpose of orientating our reason 
towards religious ideas, whether their proper interpretation is Ontological or not. 
                                                     
11 Beiser, 2002, bk. I, ch. 9, sets out the issue clearly; see esp. pp. 174 ff. 
12 This issue is well put in G. Martin, 1968, pp. 270-4, 278. (Martin suggests analogical concept-
application, in addition to the un-/schematised distinction, as a way for Kant to account for his 
position.) 
13 See Forberg, 1798. 
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 The two loci of uncertainty are connected. The question of whether or not 
philosophical explanation must have an ontological terminus was precisely what Kant 
took to be at issue in his pre-Critical The Only Possible Basis for a Proof of the 
Existence of God (Beweisgrund), where he does affirm that sheer possibility must 
have an ontological ground − a conclusion which is reversed in the first Critique at 
the point where Kant declares that the Ideal of Pure Reason, the idea of a highest 
being that provides for the “sum-total of all possibilities,” can be taken by us only as 
an idea.14 Thus, if one thinks that genuine ontologically significant cognition is 
achieved through the practical postulates, then Kant’s Critical system may be viewed 
as having finally in its practical part rejoined the ontological order, of things in 
themselves, which transcendental explanation initially cut itself loose from. If, on the 
other hand, the practical cognition spoken of in connection with the practical 
postulates is not taken realistically, then this is not the result, and Kant’s system 
continues to allow itself to be read as ontologically agnostic. 
 2. Schulze. Gottlob Ernst Schulze, as one of the many early critics of 
Kantianism, is of especial importance in relation to Fichte, whose review of Schulze’s 
Aenesidemus shows how seriously he took Schulze’s criticisms, and who declared 
that grasping the questions that Schulze had posed is a condition for understanding 
the WL.15 
 Schulze put pressure on Kant at precisely the two points just mentioned, 
where Kant’s stand on the ontological commitment of the Critical system is 
uncertain, and he did so on one and the same basis. First, Schulze argues that Critical 
philosophy − more conspicuously in Reinhold, who has magnified certain feature of 
Kant, but also in Kant himself − makes appeal in its explication of objective 
experience to ontological items (things in themselves in general, and in particular the 
elements that compose what is called in Reinhold “the Faculty of Representation”), in 
violation of what he takes to be the defining Critical tenet, that there is no valid 
inference from necessities of representation to real existences.16 Second, Schulze 
argues that Kant’s attempt to supply belief in God with a moral warrant is abortive, 
because the practical act of taking on this belief can be performed only if its 
conditions of possible success are known to be met: that is, according to Schulze, 
only if theoretical reason has already established that the belief has a really existing 
object; so Kant, in running from the practical necessity of thought to a real existence, 
is once again violating the ground-rule of Critical method.17 
 Fichte’s response to Schulze appears to consist in at the very least a scaling 
down, perhaps a relinquishing altogether, of ontological commitment. Schulze’s 
objections, Fichte observes, reflect his assumption that the ego must have validity “in 
                                                     
14 A577-83/B605-611. 
15 Fichte GA II, 3: 389, Z. 1-4. 
16 Schulze, 1792, p. 132 (Eng. trans., p. 113): “For the Critique claims that the original determinations 
of the human mind are the real ground or source of the necessary synthetic judgements found in our 
knowledge; but it does this by inferring, from the fact that we can only think of the faculty of 
representation as the ground of these judgements, that the mind must be their ground in actual fact 
too.” 
17 Schulze, 1792, Fünfter Brief, pp. 318-36. 
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itself,” whereas in fact its principles should hold only “for the ego itself:”18 what we 
should say is that “[t]he faculty of representation exists for the faculty of 
representation and through the faculty of representation“,19 a statement which allows 
itself to be read as an epistemologisation of the faculty, removing it from the province 
of ontological commitment. 
 Regarding the moral theology, Schulze’s claim is that the “ought” in “I ought 
to believe in God” is valid only if I have theoretical knowledge that it is possible for 
me to so believe. But, Fichte supposes, this forgets, or misunderstands, the primacy of 
the practical which is also part of Kant’s Copernican revolution, and which makes 
“ought” the determinant of “can,” subordinating questions of ontology. When it is 
appreciated, Fichte argues, that the command to believe is the direct expression of a 
striving which in turn derives from the self-positing of the I, we see that belief in God 
just is a certain way of representing the object of our striving.20 The logic of 
Schulze’s criticisms, Fichte appears to affirm, is that transcendental philosophy must 
lose its ontological sub-structure. 
 These moves are made, of course, not for the sake of saving Kant’s system in 
its original lettering, but with a more ambitious Kantianism, shaped by Reinhold, in 
view, and it is not hard to see why, given this new aim, Fichte should be expected to 
address and resolve the matter concerning ontology and philosophical explanation 
that Kant had left undecided: Fichte’s “absolutisation” of the transcendental, its 
assumption of a strongly foundational role, together with his aim of achieving a total 
unification of reason, make it unfeasible to persevere in Kantian agnosticism. With 
Fichte’s appreciation of Schulze’s skeptical objections factored in, Fichte is provided 
with very strong motivation for resolving Kant’s ambiguity in a Non-Ontological 
direction. 
 3. Jacobi. One further stimulus to Fichte bearing on the issue of ontological 
commitment comes from Jacobi, whose philosophical concerns, as much as those of 
Schulze, were internalised by Fichte. 
 What might be expected, given Jacobi’s thesis of the primitive, unanalysable 
and foundational role of existential awareness, and his complaint of the ontological 
nihilism of Kant’s transcendental idealism, is an impetus to correct the alleged 
ontological deficit in Critical philosophy. I suggest that in a sense this does happen in 
Fichte, but in an indirect and complicated way, that reflects Fichte’s appreciation of 
another strand in Jacobi’s critique of philosophy. 
 In addition to attacking philosophy for failing to supply valid proofs justifying 
our ordinary beliefs, and for trading in mere empty thought-forms, Jacobi argues that 
the very attempt at philosophical justification of ordinary consciousness is self-
stultifying. The justification that philosophy aims to provide for beliefs belonging to 
ordinary consciousness must be unavailable, in some sense, to ordinary 
consciousness, else no philosophical justification would be needed. However, 
whatever it is, if anything, that philosophy can provide a justification of, cannot be 
                                                     
18 Fichte, 1794a, p. 71 [FW I, 16]. 
19 Fichte, 1794a, p. 67 [FW I, 11]. 
20 Fichte, 1794a, pp. 74-6 [FW I, 21-4]. 
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beliefs as held by ordinary consciousness, for these are held without the justification 
supplied by philosophy. Philosophical justification, if it comes at all, therefore comes 
too late: at most it bears on reflections, analogues or mere images of the beliefs 
present in natural consciousness. Jacobi accordingly embraces “the concept of an 
immediate certainty, which not only needs no proof, but excludes all proofs 
absolutely, and is simply and solely the representing itself agreeing with the thing 
being represented.”21 This concept of belief-immanent justification renders 
philosophical justification otiose, but without it ordinary consciousness can only be 
regarded in a skeptical light, as lacking all justification. 
 Fichte would appear to take to heart Jacobi’s worry about the corrosive impact 
of philosophy on natural consciousness.22 His response may be put like this: While 
Jacobi has identified correctly the problem facing traditional attempts at justification 
of ordinary consciousness, Jacobi has too narrow a view of the range of options, for 
reasons which are directly related to his failure to appreciate what is distinctive of 
transcendental philosophy − namely, its insistence on the heterogeneity of 
transcendental and pre-transcendental forms of explanation. It is possible for 
philosophical grounds of ordinary beliefs to avoid undermining those beliefs as-held 
in ordinary consciousness, so long as they are situated at a level that is properly 
transcendental. And one way of establishing the discreteness of the transcendental 
level is to construe transcendental grounds Non-Ontologically. The ordinary 
standpoint conceives explanation ontologically, and to the extent that philosophical 
grounds are ontological grounds, ones that are missing from the purview of common 
sense, philosophical justification faces Jacobi’s objection. If, however, philosophical 
grounds are non-ontological, then to cite them is not to bring into the picture anything 
that is missing − by its own lights − from ordinary consciousness. And so 
philosophical grounds, when non-ontological, can fulfil their intended justificatory 
function. 
 A sharp division of spheres, whereby ontological matters become exclusively 
the prerogative of ordinary, pre-philosophical consciousness, allows transcendental 
philosophy to claim that, precisely by not involving itself in ontological commitment, 
by offering only Non-Ontological grounds, it underwrites the ontological outlook of 
ordinary consciousness. It also addresses Jacobi’s complaint that Kantian philosophy 
leaves being out of the picture. If ontological claims are categorially inappropriate to 
transcendental explanation, then transcendental philosophy cannot be criticised as 
ontologically deficient − on the contrary, it can be claimed to keep being in the 
picture, precisely by locating it exclusively at the level of ordinary consciousness. In 
addition, the Non-Ontological turn gives Fichte the basis for answering Jacobi’s 
charge that philosophical systematicity leads inevitably to Spinozism: Fichte can 
grant this entailment in the specific case of any “dogmatic” philosophy that, like 
Spinoza’s, starts from being and confines itself to ontological explanation, but deny 
                                                     
21 Jacobi, 1785, p. 162 (Eng. trans., p. 230). 
22 E.g. in 1797b, p. 93 [FW I, 508], Fichte endorses Jacobi’s view of what it means to prove something 
(specifically, here: appeal to immediate certainty is involved in the concept of proof). See also Fichte, 
1801, p. 42 [FW II, 327] and pp. 45 ff. [FW II, 331 ff.], comparing the impact of earlier philosophy on 
common understanding with that of the WL. 
 9 
that it is a necessary corollary of philosophical systematicity as such; a 
transcendental, Non-Ontological philosophical system may be anti-Spinozistic. 
 The intention of relating the philosophical standpoint to the ordinary 
standpoint in such a way as to remove philosophical grounds from the categorial orbit 
of ordinary consciousness, is undoubtedly present in Fichte, and it is very plausible to 
think that it, in combination with the need to answer Schulze, led Fichte to appreciate 
what stood to be gained by construing transcendental explanation Non-Ontologically. 
The WL could accordingly be held to provide grounding explanations of ordinary 
consciousness without referring to any hidden reality with respect to which ordinary 
consciousness could be convicted of ignorance, and without carrying metaphysical 
implications that subvert ordinary belief. Whether, however, this is the whole story, 
or merely one of several, possibly competing considerations influencing Fichte, is 
what will be considered next. 
 
4.  Fichte on the status of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre 
 
In the course of his many attempts to clarify the status of the WL, Fichte shows 
himself to be engaged intensively with the question of its Ontological/Non-
Ontological status. In this section I will discuss the principal themes bearing on the 
issue in writings of the Jena period and passages where Fichte addresses the issue 
directly. In section 5 the evidence of post-Jena writings will be added. 
 
4.1.  Key themes 
 
Fichte offers a variety of formulations for what it is that the philosopher is doing in 
giving the account offered in the WL, most often describing it as the construction of a 
“model [Modell]” of ordinary consciousness that reveals its internal composition.23 
The general thrust of such statements is to warn his reader off a plain and literal 
construal of the WL’s story: the characterisation of the WL as a model informs us 
that its dialectic cannot be taken as a description of a directly given object, and that 
its intelligibility presupposes some special, philosophical understanding of how it is 
related to its object. Fichte’s chief motive in so doing, however, is apparently to bring 
out the heterogeneity of philosophical thought and the standpoint of life: Fichte 
wishes to forestall a naive taking-for-real of the WL story, not because he is worried 
that it may appear metaphysical in the sense of transcending the bounds of sensibility, 
but because, with an eye to responding to the challenge set by Jacobi, he wants to 
underline that the philosophical explanations of the WL do not deal in entities that  
could properly figure as real from the ordinary standpoint, and so that its explanations 
can neither affect the integrity of ordinary consciousness nor be assessed from its 
standpoint. 
 Regarding the distinction of the standpoint of transcendental philosophy from 
that of life and ordinary understanding, Fichte emphasises three things: their 
                                                     
23 See Fichte, 1799, sects. 6-7, and Fichte, 1801, pp. 61-2 [FW II, 350-2] and pp. 68-9 [FW II, 360-1], 
drawing the analogy with a watch. 
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discreteness (they cannot both be occupied simultaneously), the dependence of the 
transcendental on the ordinary standpoint (the latter is a material necessary condition 
for the former), and their asymmetric intelligibility (the transcendental standpoint 
grasps the ordinary, but the ordinary necessarily misrepresents the transcendental).24 
Once again, what Fichte is consistently concerned to emphasise in these contexts is 
that philosophical insight “does not create any obstacles for common sense,”25 and 
though, as said earlier, there is reason to suppose that the thought that this is due to its 
Non-Ontologicality is present in Fichte’s mind, this much is not actually said by him. 
To that extent, it cannot be concluded from the account given by Fichte of how the 
transcendental standpoint is distinguished from and relates to the standpoint of life, 
that it is Non-Ontological. 
 Some of Fichte’s remarks do, however, suggest an outright fictionalist view of 
the WL. The WL is, he once says, an “instrument” to be thrown aside when its work 
is done,26 and on a number of occasions he calls the WL a “Fiktion.”27 This choice of 
term is owed to Maimon, and the influence of Maimon’s theory of philosophical 
fictions can be detected in some of the contexts where Fichte employs it. The import 
of the Maimonian connection as regards the issue of ontological commitment is, 
however, relatively limited, for a number of reasons.28 In general, references to the 
WL as a Fiktion notwithstanding, Fichte does not characterise the WL in explicitly 
Non-Ontological terms, as is done when we are instructed explicitly to construe a 
certain theory in a purely instrumentalist manner: in the main, through the analogies 
                                                     
24 E.g. Fichte, 1799, sects 5-9; Fichte, 1794b, pp. 200-6 [GA II, 3: 324-33]; Fichte, 1796/99, pp. 105-7 
[GA IV, 2: 27; WLnm 24-5]. 
25 The quotation continues: “For common sense cannot become conscious of these operations as they 
have just been postulated (since they condition the possibility of all consciousness and thus lie outside 
its sphere),” Fichte, 1796-97, p. 25 [FW III, 25]. 
26 Fichte, 1799, sects. 6-7. 
27 E.g., Fichte to Schelling, 15 November 1800: “[...] just as transcendental philosophy, through a 
similar fiction, has consciousness construct itself” [GA III, 4: 361]. 
28 Maimon’s Non-Ontological “Fiktionen” are, interestingly, connected by him too with the Schulze 
issue that is so important for Fichte: in Maimon 1794, p. xxxv, “d,” Maimon claims that employing 
fictions to maximise systematic unity is all that philosophy can do given its inability to determine any 
real ground outside our faculty of knowledge (“einen Realgrund außer dem Erkenntnisvermögen”) 
(quoted in Breazeale, 2002, p. 198). However, Fichte rejects philosophical tenets of Maimon’s that are 
required for the WL to count as a Fiktion in Maimon’s sense − see, e.g., Fichte, 1795, pp. 288-9 [FW  
I, 387-8], where Fichte rejects the “deception” element in Maimon’s view − and he does not take up 
the fictionalist, “als ob” interpretation of the absolute I proposed by Forberg (1797-98, Siebenter Brief, 
p. 169); indeed he says “the Kantian “as if” is utterly opposed to my system” (letter to Reinhold, 22 
April 1799, in Fichte 1988, p. 432 [GA III, 3: 330]). Fichte also does not subscribe to Maimon’s 
formalism. There is a hint in Fichte’s Eignen Meditationen über Elementarphilosophie [GA II, 3: 192, 
Z. 1-5] that Fichte regards Maimon’s Fiktion status as one that the absolute I can at least be said to 
have, rather than, as the only status that it can be said to have. When Fichte, 1801, pp. 98-9 [FW II, 
398-9], talks of the WL as a “just as if [gleich als ob]” representation and a “Fiction,” it is only to 
underline that it is (i) not a narrative of true events in time, and (ii) merely isomorphic with that which 
actually produces real consciousness. This whole question has in any case been discussed very 
thoroughly in Breazeale, 2002, and Breazeale acknowledges (p. 191) that fictionalism is contradicted 
by Fichte’s description of the WL as a “real philosophy,” and that it would obstruct both Fichte’s claim 
for the WL’s uniqueness and his refutation of dogmatism; on Breazeale’s view fictionalism is not 
ultimately a contender for the status of the WL but only one element in Fichte’s thinking. Part of the 
appeal of the “Fiktion” label for Fichte is surely to acknowledge how the WL must appear from the 
standpoint of ordinary consciousness, and perhaps to indicate the dependence which the WL shares 
with fictions on an act of freedom and their shared semi-autonomy in regard to empirical reality. 
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he draws, and by speaking of the philosopher as engaged in “observation” and 
“experiment,”29 Fichte tells us to understand the WL as a model of something, a 
“description and representation [Beschreibung und Darstellung].”30 A model of 
what? In one sense, and as Fichte says, the object of the model is simply real 
empirical consciousness, but since the model through its anatomy thereof leads to the 
identification of transcendental structures, in another sense it is these, the explanatory 
transcendental grounds of empirically real consciousness, which are its object.31 
 If attention is now turned to the objects of the WL’s modelling in this latter 
sense, we find that Fichte, in addition to bringing them under his concept of positing, 
consistently describes them as acts of the human mind.32 Fichte emphasises, 
furthermore, that the identification of these structures is a matter of their discovery − 
the structures have reality and they pre-exist the WL.33 Fichte insists on this last point 
in replying to Schmid’s attack on the WL as having fabricated its objects in contrast 
with Schmid’s own putatively Kantian practice of sticking closely to the “facts of 
consciousness.”34 
 Yet these statements leave the following to be settled. Even supposing 
Fichte’s ontological commitment to the I of empirical consciousness (“the person”35) 
to be clear and straightforward, the question concerning the status of the WL is a 
different question, since this concerns the positings which result from the 
philosophical modelling of the I; and when Fichte talks, as he does in his reply to 
Schmid, about the “reality” of the acts, this may mean no more than that the WL’s 
assertions are strict necessities of reflection − which would be to say, in Non-
Ontological parlance, just that the perspective which the WL articulates is the true 
perspective. This may capture all of the force of Fichte’s emphasis on discovery 
rather than invention. This supposition gets some support from other passages where 
Fichte may be read as saying that the objects of the WL are to be thought of only in 
relation to philosophical reflection, i.e. where his view may be thought to be that, 
although philosophical reflection causes acts of positing to appear as objects (even, 
                                                     
29 E.g. Fichte, 1797b, pp. 37-8 [FW I, 454-5]; Fichte, 1796/99, p. 101 [WLnm 21] and p. 120 [WLnm 
34-5]. 
30 Fichte, 1799, p. 344 [FW V, 342]. See the “model-theoretic understanding” of the WL in Zöller, 
1998, pp. 22-3. 
31 To avoid a confusion that threatens at this point: Note that one cannot answer the question by 
identifying the objects of the WL with the objects constructed in intuition by the philosopher. It is true 
that there is also a representational relation to be spoken of between (a) the propositions, the Sätzen, of 
the WL, in the sense of a piece of discourse, and (b) the constructed objects within philosophical 
consciousness. But to point this out is merely to set the stage for the real question of what is signified 
by the WL in the full sense of a set of propositions grounded on objects constructed in intuition. It may 
also be noted that nothing is gained by describing the propositions of the WL as having “merely 
epistemic” status or significance: the question is how the WL’s transcendental conditions function 
epistemically (whether on an Ontological or a Non-Ontological basis). 
32 E.g.: Fichte, 1796/99, pp. 83-4 [WLnm 8] (“the human mind’s original ways of acting,” “the inner 
workings of finite, rational beings”); Fichte, 1794c, p. 126 [FW I, 70] (“acts of the human mind”) and 
p. 132 [FW I, 79] (“corresponds [correspondirt] to an action of the human mind”); Fichte, 1794b, pp. 
203-4 [GA II, 3: 328] (“the actions of the human mind itself”); and letter to Reinhold, 2 July 1795, in 
Fichte 1988, p. 399 [GA III, 2: 344] (“the entire activity of the human mind”). 
33 Fichte, 1794-95, p. 120 [FW I, 123-4]. Fichte, 1801, p. 66 [FW II, 357-8] and p. 69 [FW II, 360]: the 
philosopher “re-invents” a consciousness which is “already there [schon da ist].” 
34 Fichte, 1796, pp. 324-6 [FW II, 444-5], pp. 330-1 [FW II, 451-2]. 
35 Fichte, 1796/99, p. 104 [WLnm 23]. 
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as objects having a certain, “ideal” kind of being36), this is only an appearance, of 
indirect cognitive value in so far as the philosophical exercise is ultimately 
instructive.37 
 Further remarks of Fichte’s about the concept of activity shows that the 
designation of the objects of the WL as “acts,” like their designation as positings,38 
does not conclusively determine them as having Ontological status. The strongest 
single textual consideration favouring a Non-Ontological construal of the WL is the 
explicit and striking contrast drawn by Fichte on many occasions between being and 
activity, and his repeated claim that the WL assigns priority to activity over being, 
and that it is the mistake of other, dogmatic philosophical positions that they reverse 
this priority.39 Fichte describes the concept of being as a negative one, derived from 
activity by way of its cancellation: 
 
Being is a negative concept [...] In relation to an active subject that is posited 
as lying outside of being itself, being negates; being cancels productive 
activity [...] Being is the characteristic feature of the Not-I. Activity is what 
characterizes the I. Dogmatism begins with being, which it interprets as 
something primitive and immediate.40 
 
 It may be wondered if Fichte can speak intelligibly of activity without 
according it being. The answer lies in the specific way that we are to think activity, 
namely, from the inside, i.e. by taking up its perspective. In the “Second 
Introduction” Fichte argues that his employment of the concept of intellectual 
intuition does not, appearances to the contrary, offend against Kant, when the 
ambiguity in that notion is recognised. Defined as cognition of things in themselves, 
claims for intellectual intuition are unKantian, but the WL, Fichte says, decouples the 
notion of intellectual intuition from that of thing in itself: intellectual intuition as he 
conceives it “is not directed toward any sort of being whatsoever; instead, it is 
directed at an acting.”41 The being/acting opposition we have encountered earlier, but 
here Fichte adds an explanation of what it is for intellectual intuition to be “directed 
at an acting:” it is, he says, quite simply the mode in which we are “conscious of the 
categorical imperative.” Now this mode of consciousness is very plausibly, on a 
Kantian analysis, ontologically uncommitted.42 So if the WL is the explication of 
intellectual intuition, and if this intuition has no ontological character, then the Non-
                                                     
36 E.g. Fichte, 1797b, p. 80 [FW I, 494], where Fichte does attribute “ideal being,” or “sheerly ideal 
being,” to the WL’s acts. 
37 E.g. Fichte, 1797b, pp. 78 [FW I, 492-3] and p. 84 [FW I, 498]. Another caveat regarding the 
realism appropriate to the WL’s objects also seems to be provided by their description as (schematic) 
“images,” Fichte, 1794b, p. 203 [GA II, 3: 328]. 
38 See Zöller’s gloss on “setzen,” 2001, pp. 140-2. 
39  Fichte also defines his differences from Schelling in these terms: see FW XI, 368-70. 
40 Fichte, 1796/99, p. 131 [GA IV, 2: 39; WLnm 41-2]; see also p. 67. 
41 Fichte, 1797b, p. 56 [FW I, 472]. 
42 That is, with regard merely to its obligating character, holding aside its arguable metaphysical 
presuppositions. See Fichte, 1798a, p. 56 [FW IV, 54]: “the manner in which something is thought 
therein [in the categorical imperative] has been called an “ought,” as opposed to a “being” [man hat die 
Weise, wie in ihm etwas gedacht wird, zum Gegensatze des Seyns als ein Sollen bezeichnet].” 
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Ontological status of the WL can be inferred directly. The WL could then be 
understood as the discursive presentation of perspective in the sense described earlier, 
where the perspective in question is that of practical necessity, of having-to, 
obligedness-to, or its-being-demanded-of-one-that.43 This coheres with another key 
theme in Fichte, his description of the principles of the WL as “postulates,” his claim 
that “the scope of Kant’s practical postulate is too narrow” and that “consciousness in 
its entirety is included within” it.44 
 
4.2.  Key passages 
 
Having identified the principal themes in connection with which the issue of 
ontological commitment arises, I want now to look at passages where Fichte broaches 
it directly. 
 1. Grundlage, §4. In what must be Fichte’s earliest discussion of the issue, in 
the theoretical part of the Grundlage, Fichte suggests a complex view that brings 
together several of the points discussed above.45 Fichte describes the object of the 
WL (specifically, here, the positing expressed in its second principle) (i) as a “fact,” 
“in a higher sense of the word” (than, presumably, Reinhold’s), yet (ii) as one which 
is “artificially brought forth according to the rules of reflection,” “artificially 
engendered through the spontaneity of philosophizing.” Fichte then adds the 
qualification that (iii) this artifice pertains only to the “consciousness” of the fact, not 
to the fact itself, and in any case insists (iv) that what is in question (as corresponding 
to the principle) is “a primordial fact occurring in the human mind.” At the same 
time Fichte says, twice, (v) that philosophical knowledge is only of “something” in 
our mind that corresponds to the principle, suggesting that this corresponding 
“something” does not exist as originally present in our mind in the form which is 
displayed by the objects engendered by philosophical reflection.46 Fichte is here, 
therefore, apparently seeking to affirm a realistic, representational understanding of 
the WL at some level, while slackening its relation to the ontological domain in a way 
that allows it to be thought that, while the positings of the WL do indeed indicate 
some ontological item(s), they themselves lack direct reference and should not be 
ascribed Ontological status. 
 2. Foundations of Natural Right, First Main Division. Towards the beginning 
of the Foundations of Natural Right Fichte poses squarely the question of the 
Ontological/Non-Ontological status of the WL: 
 
                                                     
43 It is a further question whether this is generic practical or specifically moral necessity. In this place 
at least Fichte seems to envisage consciousness of the moral law only as a means to illuminate 
practical self-consciousness in general. Its privilegedly pre-mundane, hence transcendental character is 
emphasised in Fichte, 1794a, p. 75 [FW I, 22]. 
44 Fichte, 1796/99, p. 298 [GA IV, 2: 139; WLnm 146]; see also pp. 109-10 [GA IV, 2: 28-9; WLnm 
28]. 
45 Fichte, 1794-95, pp. 196-7 [FW I, 219-20]. 
46 Fichte often draws attention to the artifice involved in the WL’s representation of what is essentially 
unitary as a composite of separate, as if temporally distinct, actions; see, e.g., Fichte, 1796/99, pp. 102-
3 [WLnm 22-3]. 
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One might ask: if reality belongs only to that which is necessarily posited 
by the I, then what reality [Realität] is supposed to belong to those actions that 
lie outside the sphere of all consciousness and are not posited within 
consciousness?47 
 
His immediate answer − “Obviously, no reality except in so far as it is posited, and 
thus merely a reality for philosophical understanding” − refers us on to the question 
of what it is for something to have posited-reality, reality-for-philosophical-
understanding. Philosophical understanding is defined, Fichte says, in terms that stick 
close to Maimon, by its aim “to unite the operations of the human mind 
systematically in an ultimate ground.”48 This aim makes it necessary “to assume” that 
such and such are “actions [Handlungen] of the human mind.” The question then 
becomes what we must think about the Ontological/Non-Ontological status of that-
which-we-must-assume in discharging the cognitive task at hand. And here Fichte 
draws an analogy. Primitive peoples, he supposes, lack an interest in the unity of 
experience and consequently allow “individual perceptions to lie scattered about 
within their consciousness:” for them, the universal connection of things in causal 
reciprocity, affirmed in Kant’s Analogies, “does not exist at all.” It does exist, and 
has reality, however, for we who seek unity of experience. And this, Fichte claims, 
provides the right analogy for thinking about the Ontological/Non-Ontological status 
of the WL: its positings have “the same reality” for philosophical consciousness, i.e. 
in relation to the interest in an unconditioned ground of cognition, as the causal order 
has in relation to ordinary consciousness, i.e. in relation to the interest in systematic 
unity of experience. 
 The trouble with this analogy is that it can be taken to count equally either for 
or against an Ontological interpretation of the WL, depending on how it is drawn. On 
the one hand, since the causal order is transcendentally ideal, the analogy suggests 
that the WL be viewed as a construction merely internal to philosophical 
consciousness; on the other hand, since ordinary consciousness does at its own level 
take the causal order to be fully ontologically real, and there is no super-
transcendental level to “correct” the philosophical standpoint, the analogy suggests 
that the WL be taken Ontologically. What would decide between these two 
interpretations would be a categorical claim about the status of the interest which 
defines philosophy and relative to which philosophical objects have reality − a 
statement to the effect either that the unconditioned unity of cognition is merely a 
subjective need of our reason, or that it expresses ontological necessity. But Fichte 
does not make either claim, with the result that the Ontological/Non-Ontological 
status question is again left undecided. What Fichte instead considers it important to 
underline is once again the discreteness of levels, complaining that philosophically 
inferior minds fail to “pay attention to the reality that is being highlighted here” and 
insists on “reducing it to the kind of reality they are familiar with.” 
                                                     
47 Fichte, 1796-97, p. 25 [FW III, 25]. 
48 Ibid. 
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 3. Replies to Forberg in the “Second Introduction” and “Postscript.” 
Forberg alleged a dilemma regarding the ontological status of the absolute I of the 
WL’s first principle. Forberg argued that it cannot be a “Something,” since if it were 
it could not be an absolute principle, and yet cannot be a “Nothing,” since a nothing 
cannot be a principle. So it must be, as he puts it, “a third thing between them”49 − an 
incoherent status, Forberg argues, that Fichte tries to conceal by attributing “ideal 
being” to the I. This, Forberg continues, is no more effective a way of showing the 
possibility of the absolute I than the possibility of a square circle can be established 
by according it “ideal being.”50 
 Fichte replies to Forberg in the “Second Introduction,” and in an editorial 
“Postscript” to Forberg’s essay, where he writes: 
 
The entire presupposition that underlies this question, that is, the assumption 
that everything that we can talk about must either be or not be, is completely 
inadmissible and dogmatic. Our philosophy is acquainted with something that 
is even higher than any being [kenne etwas, das da höher liege, als alles 
Seyn]. In short, we replied that our A neither is nor is not; in no possible sense 
is “being” a predicate of this A.51 
 
This may seem to leave no room for doubt that the positings of the WL are Non-
Ontological. In a moment more textual evidence for resisting this conclusion will be 
adduced, but for now the point to make is just that, for all of the above, it remains 
thinkable that in Fichte’s denials that the WL’s transcendental can be brought under 
the concept of being, he is employing the concept of being in a restricted or narrow 
sense,52 in a form determined for application to objects-for-a-subject − in the same 
way, or in a way analogous to that in which, for Kant the concept of existence has a 
schematised form, in which it can be applied only to empirical objects, and an 
unschematised form, employed when Kant speaks of the existence of things in 
themselves. Indeed this is how Schelling in the System of Transcendental Idealism 
replies to Forberg, namely by distinguishing different senses of being.53 
                                                     
49 Forberg, 1797-98: “The difficulty was this: if an absolute principle of all things is to be found, then 
it must in the first place not be Nothing, for it would then be no sort of principle; and in the second 
place it must also not be Something, for it would then not be an absolute principle. No third thing 
between the Something and the Nothing offers itself as thinkable. Thus it appears an altogether 
incoherent undertaking to search for an absolute principle − something it is impossible to find” 
(Zweiter Brief, p. 156); “Consequently the absolute I would have to be neither Something nor Nothing: 
it would have to stand between a Something and a Nothing, thus in the middle between two 
contradictorily opposed terms, and this would be according to all the rules of thought the highest of 
inconsistencies” (Zehnter Brief, p. 173). 
50 Forberg, 1797-98, Zehnter Brief, p. 174. 
51 Fichte, 1798b, p. 137 [GA I, 4: 466]. See also Fichte 1798a, pp. 40-1 [FW IV, 36-7].  
52 See Lachs, 1987-88, pp. 171-2. 
53 Schelling, 1800, p. 32 [SW II, 375-6]: the self, “since it is the principle of all reality,” cannot have 
being of the derived sort that attaches to things: rather it “is being-itself [das Sein selbst],” self-
supporting being, which we think through a concept “higher than that of any thing,” namely that of 
“doing, or activity.” Schelling later criticises Fichte’s attempt to avoid speaking of activity in terms of 
being: Schelling, 1802, p. 199 [SW III, 199]. 
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 Other comments of Fichte’s in the context of his reply to Forberg do 
suggest that he is talking about, in Kant’s terms, schematised versions of the 
categories, and it is also important that Forberg indicates that he regards “being” as 
univocal and as adequately grasped through attention to any ordinary conditioned 
existent, such that it would be reasonable for Fichte to assume in this context of 
argument that only a restricted sense of being − one fashioned in accordance with the 
outlook of ordinary, non-transcendental consciousness − need be regarded as in play. 
To this must be added that Fichte does not explain his “neither-is-nor-is-not” position 
by retreating to any claim to the effect that the WL is “merely a model,” nor by 
adding a Kantian rider: he does not say merely that we are “forced to assume,” or 
“need to think,” something higher than being for the transcendental purpose of 
making sense of our epistemic relations. Rather his claim is to be actually acquainted 
with “something that is even higher than any being.” 
 This would leave it open that the Fichtean transcendental, Fichtean activity, 
can be brought under an unschematised, indeterminate concept of being − even if, in 
the context of explaining to Forberg his errors, it can serve no purpose for Fichte to 
spell this out. 
 The further evidence that Fichte is by no means of one mind as regards the 
refusal of some sort of attenuated Ontological status to the transcendental or activity 
includes a footnote in the Grundlage which attributes “absolute being [absolutes 
Seyn]” to the transcendental level of the I’s positings,54 and the many places where 
Fichte does not say that being is categorially inapplicable to the I but rather that its 
being is its self-positing or activity: 
 
The sole type of being of the I [Seyn des Ich] with which we are here 
concerned is the being which it possesses within the self-intuition we have 
now described; or, more rigorously expressed, the being of the I with which 
we are concerned is the being of this intuition itself.55 
 
This statement is of particular importance, first because Fichte claims to be speaking 
here from a “higher speculative standpoint [höheren Standpunct der Speculation]”56 
than that from which he had earlier in the text denied that being belongs to the I;57 
and second because, in what immediately follows, Fichte explicates his claim through 
a denial that the I has being over and above its self-intuition, thus seeming to confirm 
that this self-intuition is indeed a case of being. 
 It is furthermore possible to explain more fully why the idea that activity does 
after all have Ontological status should not be taken to be ruled out by Fichte’s 
opposition of being and activity. In the “Second Introduction” Fichte writes: “what is 
comprehended within this intuition becomes comprehended through its opposition to 
mere being. ‘Acting is not being, and being is not acting:’ this is the only definition of 
                                                     
54 Fichte, 1794-95, p. 245n [FW I, 278 Anm.]. 
55 Fichte, 1797c, p. 114 [FW I, 529]. This prompts us to reconsider Fichte’s ambiguous claim that the 
faculty of representation “exists only for” itself as, after all, a genuine Ontological claim. 
56 Fichte, 1797c, p. 110 [FW I, 525]. 
57 Fichte, 1797c, p. 109 [FW I, 524]. 
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acting one can obtain from its mere concept.”58 That is, Fichte may be understood 
to be saying, at the level of concepts, and only in so far as we proceed through them, 
do we arrive at an opposition of being and activity.59 The reason for this lies, 
plausibly, in Fichte’s view of the impossibility of representing conceptually the kind 
of being possessed by activity: concept-application, or judging, is a case of 
determining a subject, and so necessarily construes the subject non-actively; whereas 
in acting what we have is, as it were, a subject turning itself over into a predicate.60 
This suggests that acting is opposed to being, not as the Non-Ontological to the 
Ontological, but in a way closer to that in which, in traditional metaphysics, 
becoming is opposed to being,61 or, in romantic language that Fichte often employs, 
living being is opposed to “dead permanency.”62 
 Second, there is the apparently procedural or methodological character of the 
priority of activity over being. This comes out more clearly in §2 of the “Second 
Introduction.” What Fichte here takes to be the very first philosophical question, 
namely “What is the origin of the system of representations accompanied by a feeling 
of necessity?,” is, he says, equivalent to the question, “how do we come to assume 
the existence of any being?,” or “how is a being for us possible?;” and to answer this 
question correctly requires, he says, in proto-Husserlian terms, that one “abstracts 
from all being” and ceases to employ the concept of being.63 The point is therefore 
that, in addition to its arguably resting on a restricted application of the concept, 
Fichte’s setting-aside of being is only preparatory: here Fichte is only telling us what 
is needed to come to form a concept of the transcendental standpoint, not yet 
describing what we apprehend from it, viz. activity.64 
 4. Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre novo methodo. In a sub-
section titled “Relation of this system to experience,”65 Fichte again poses the 
question: “philosophy encompasses a system of those actions by means of which 
objects come into being for us. But do these actions described by idealism actually 
occur? Do they possess reality, or are they merely invented [erdichtet] by 
                                                     
58 Fichte, 1797b, p. 45 [FW I, 461]. 
59 W. Martin, 1997, p. 52, draws attention to this point. Supporting this interpretation is Fichte’s letter 
to Schelling, 31 May 1801: “everything toward which mere thought is directed and, in consequence of 
this, to which the real ground [Realgrund] is applied, is being [Seyn];” later in the letter Fichte 
describes being as “seeing that does not penetrate itself,” but the being in question is only the 
determined being of “given actuality [gegebnen Wirklichkeit]” [GA III, 5: 46]. This supports the 
contention that the being/activity opposition turns on a restricted sense of being, and that Fichte is not 
in the habit of marking explicitly this restriction even when he has it in mind. 
60 See Fichte, 1799, p. 372 [FW V, 367]: “My feelings, desires, thinking, willing, etc., I know of 
immediately by accomplishing those acts. They come into my consciousness by no act of mediation, 
but only by my positing them, by my being in them [daß ich in ihnen bin].” Also relevant here is 
Fichte’s agent-causationism: see, e.g., 1798a, Introduction, p. 9 [FW IV, 3]. 
61 Which is how Schelling puts it, 1797-98, p. 79 [SW I, 291]. 
62 Fichte, 1799, p. 371 [FW V, 366]. In this connection see Lachs 1987-88, pp. 171-2, and Bourgeois, 
1995, pp. 99-101. 
63 1797b, p. 39 [FW I, 456]. 
64 Fichte’s tendency to vacillation between seeming to say that the absolute I is altogether pre-
ontological, and merely that it cannot be ascribed determinate objectual being – the latter prevailing 
ultimately – is magnified in Schad’s presentation of the WL: see Schad, 1800, pp. 117-18. 
65 Fichte, 1796/99, pp. 102-5 [GA IV, 2: 25-7; WLnm 22-4]. 
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philosophy?”66 Fichte’s answer here, while repeating some points already seen, 
introduces a new claim concerning what “reality for philosophical understanding” 
amounts to. If actual existence or reality is taken empirically, Fichte says, then of 
course the WL’s actions do not really exist, but this is not the only, or the most basic 
sense of existence: on the contrary, “in this system there is no other sort of reality 
[Realität] at all except for reality of the sort indicated (i.e., necessity of thinking);” 
the acts of the WL “possess the reality of necessary thinking, and it is for necessary 
thinking that reality exists.”67 
 It is not at all obvious how Fichte’s statement can be taken to answer the 
question. Fichte is of course reminding us that the WL affirms the transcendental 
ideality of objects in general and he is suggesting, presumably, that because the 
grounds of necessary thinking are themselves thought within the WL, transcendental 
idealism supplies the answer to the metaphilosophical question at hand. But what 
exactly does this answer comprise? In particular, is “being the content of necessary 
thinking” and “having real existence” one or two states of affairs? It is hard to see 
how it can be the latter – Fichte cannot be affirming a principle of inference from 
necessary thought to existence an sich, since he has conceded to Schulze that point 
entirely. Can it be the former? If so, clarification is needed. What does “really exists” 
add to “must be thought”? Presumably it adds something, else Fichte would have said 
that the WL replaces talk of Realität with talk of necessary thinking, reducing the 
former to the latter, and that is not what he does: instead he ascribes reality to 
necessary thinking, suggesting a symmetric relation of equivalence rather than an 
asymmetric relation of reduction. This however raises a question: What conception 
can we have of a unitary state of affairs that incorporates an equivalence of “real 
existence” and “necessary thinking”? Under what condition can we credit ourselves 
with such a notion? In the final section I will make a suggestion as to Fichte’s 
meaning here. 
 
5.  Non-Ontological interpretation of the Wissenschaftslehre 
 
The purpose of the foregoing textual discussion has been to show that the issue of the 
Ontological/Non-Ontological status of the WL is a central preoccupation of Fichte’s, 
and to make clear the existence of tensions on this score in Fichte’s thinking: despite 
the initial motivation deriving from problems of Kant reception, Fichte’s shift to a 
Non-Ontological conception of philosophical explanation is not clean and complete. 
Fichte’s model analogy and insistence on the reality of the objects of the WL, though 
not excluding a Non-Ontological interpretation, invite an Ontological reading; while 
Fichte’s remarks on the derivative character of the concept of being, which may 
initially appear clear repudiations of ontological commitment, nevertheless leave it 
open that the activity to which Fichte counterposes being has Ontological status in a 
sense different from that which he denies, and in this section further reason will 
                                                     
66 Fichte, 1796/99, p. 102 [WLnm 22]. Fichte on this occasion has J. S. Beck in mind as his critical 
interlocutor. 
67 Fichte, 1796/99, pp. 103-4 [GA IV, 2: 27; WLnm 23]. 
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emerge for thinking that Fichte’s apparently Non-Ontological characterisations of 
“activity” do not settle the issue. Furthermore, Fichte’s attempts to address the 
Ontological/Non-Ontological question directly, we saw in 4.2, leave much undecided; 
not even the pressure supplied by Forberg produces an unequivocal resolution.68 
 Given the indeterminacy of Fichte’s texts, the WL should next be considered 
in a more systematic spirit: Are there any general considerations pertaining to 
Fichte’s philosophical project that decide the Ontological/Non-Ontological issue? In 
this section I will first consider an interpretation of the WL that has considerable 
plausibility and that would, if correct, establish conclusively its Non-Ontological 
status. I will then offer criticism of the (widely held) view that a Non-Ontological 
reading is required in order to prevent the WL from being assimilated to traditional 
metaphysics. 
 1. The regulative interpretation of the Wissenschaftslehre. According to one 
prominent interpretation, the primacy of the practical provides the key to the WL, and 
should be taken to mean not just that the WL has practical grounds, but that it has a 
global regulative status. The WL as a whole is interpreted as an extension of Kant’s 
doctrine of the moral postulates,69 and as such, may be regarded as offering an 
explanation of the world in Non-Ontological, imperatival terms: it presents the world 
under the transcendental-perspectival aspect of our having-to.70 
 As the textual material reviewed above in section 4.1 showed, this idea has 
support. The central issue that it raises can be brought out by drawing the contrast 
with Kant. In Kant, regulative employment of reason is understood against a 
constitutive background. Regulativity is given definition and held in check by the 
prior account of constitutivity: we learn that we must only employ reason’s 
transcendental ideas regulatively, after we have learnt that contradiction results from, 
and that illusion underlies, their constitutive employment; just as practical reason’s 
employment of those ideas comes in the wake of theoretical reason’s failure to 
employ them constitutively. If, however, the constitutive background is eliminated, 
then the question arises, whether what is now called regulative does not in fact carry 
part of the meaning of Kant’s constitutive, or at least, whether “regulative” can 
continue to bear unchanged the same non-ontological meaning as it bears in Kant. 
When regulativity does not occur in opposition to constitutivity, the imperatival mood 
of putatively regulative principles ceases, one may think, to be a reliable index of 
                                                     
68 The ambiguities of the WL are reflected, in magnified form, in Novalis’ Fichte studies. See, e.g., 
Novalis, 1795-96, pp. 105-6 (Eng. trans., p. 5): [2.], “Concerning Consciousness:” consciousness is “a 
being outside of being that is nevertheless within being [ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn],” and what 
is “outside of being” is “no proper being [kein rechtes Seyn].” 
69 See Beiser, 2002, pp. 233-4, 238. See also Mandt, 1984. 
70 Another Non-Ontological interpretation of the WL, which there is no space to consider here but 
which should be noted, is Philonenko’s interpretation of the WL as engaged in transcendental dialectic, 
in Kant’s sense (Philonenko 1966, 1973, 1987-88). Philonenko considers that Fichte means to reverse 
the order of the first Critique, and that the WL, from its first principle up to the “Deduction of 
representation,” is a logic of illusion, designed to puncture the ontological pretensions of the I: “The 
absolute I is not an absolute being, as Schelling supposes, and similarly Hegel, but an idea, which one 
must prevent oneself from hypostatising” (Philonenko, 1973, p. 917). Philonenko’s view is endorsed in 
Ferry, 1990, pp. 82-3. Exegetical issues aside, on my view this interpretation faces difficulty in 
accounting for the WL’s claim to supply a logic of truth, in so far as this is held to merely follow from 
the negative work of transcendental dialectic. 
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their philosophical significance. So when Fichte describes the Wissenschaftlehre’s 
principles as postulates, the question is whether his proposed extension of the 
postulates’ scope can leave unaffected the understanding of what it is to “postulate.” 
One may think that, although Fichte is entitled to use the concept of postulation to 
draw attention to a continuity with Kant, really its meaning for Fichte has to be 
understood via the WL, not the other way round.71 
 It may be responded that, whatever the value of this point, it does not refute 
the contention that Fichte himself regarded the WL in a regulative light. This is true, 
but there are in any case reasons for doubting that Fichte’s view of practical 
consciousness is exhaustively Non-Ontological. What first of all deserves emphasis is 
that the Non-Ontological view does not follow directly from Fichte’s commitment to 
the primacy of the practical: just as (we saw) Fichte’s exclusion of being from the 
WL can be understood methodologically, as leaving space for ontological 
recharacterisation at a higher speculative level, so can his appeal to non-ontological 
pure practical consciousness, and in later texts (from early 1799) there are clear signs 
that it is Fichte’s view that practical consciousness has an ontological dimension. By 
1800, in The Vocation of Man, an explicit Ontological interpretation of the practical 
emerges. It is worth spelling this out, in order to show that no obvious discontinuity 
with earlier versions of the WL is involved. 
 In Section IV of Book III of the Vocation, having completed a partial 
exposition of what realising humanity’s vocation requires, in terms of individual 
conformity to the moral law and its collective realisation in historical progress, Fichte 
presents a carefully plotted series of transpositions of consciousness of moral 
vocation into different sets of philosophical terms.72 (1) First, Fichte re-expresses our 
situation in Kantian two-worlds language, of a sensible and a supersensible world 
each governed by a different law, which we yet unify. This can be taken in 
“constructivist” terms, the supersensible world having being only in so far as it is 
constituted by the actions of finite moral subjects.73 (2) But Fichte then makes a 
second transposition, reconceiving the moral law as a “will,” the single unitary will of 
the supersensible world,74 to which an ontological characterisation is attached: in so 
far as my own will is moral, “I am connected with the One that is there, and take part 
in its being [So stehe ich mit dem Einen, das da ist, in Verbindung, und nehme Theil 
an seinem Seyn].”75 The Ontological status of the will or the One goes beyond what 
constructivism provides for, but its existence is still correlated with the individual 
moral will. (3) In a third movement − after an excursus in which Fichte argues that 
                                                     
71 See for example Fichte, 1794-95, p. 196 [FW I, 219], where the second principle of the WL is 
described both as a postulate and said to correspond to a fact of the human mind. Schelling, provoked 
by what he regards as widespread misuse of Kant’s concept, demonstrates a considerably fuller 
awareness of the complex alteration that the concept of postulate (and an “intensified practical 
reason”) undergoes in its post-Kantian employment: see Schelling, 1795, pp. 158-9, 168, 190-2, 195 
[SW I, 210-12, 224-5, 257-9, 264], and 1797-98, esp. Appendix: On Postulates in Philosophy, pp. 132-
8 [SW I, 368-76]. Postulation, on Schelling’s early account, is  related to the immediate thinking of 
absolute being: see Schelling 1975, pp. 190-1 [SW I, 256-7]. 
72 Fichte, 1800, pp. 103-12 [FW II, 294-305]. 
73 Fichte, 1800, pp. 103-5 [FW II, 294-7]. 
74 Fichte, 1800, pp. 106-7 [FW II, 297-9]. 
75 Fichte, 1800, p. 107 [FW II, 299]. 
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this One Will must be adduced as the transcendental ground of there being a single 
sensible reality common to all finite subjects; implying that it must extend beyond 
individual subjectivity76 − the ontological characterisation is taken one step further: 
Fichte talks of “the One Eternal Infinite Will” or “infinite reason” as that which is 
“the creator of the world,” which “intervenes in our minds through the call of duty” 
and “maintains this world and thereby our finite existence.”77 
 It is worth adding that this Ontological reading of the Vocation is also given 
by Hegel in the Phenomenology: the so-called “moral world-view” comes to 
completion, Hegel thinks, with an attempt (albeit abortive) to determine “absolute 
Being.”78 To be sure, Hegel describes this being as postulated: but the point, which 
Hegel correctly sees in Fichte and underscores, is that what is postulated is postulated 
precisely as having being, not postulated as having merely postulated status. 
 The quasi-Platonic outlook of the Vocation is developed extensively in the 
post-Jena WL. In the 1804 WL transcendental enquiry first burrows down to a point 
where pure being, which has existence “of itself, in itself, and through itself,” is 
encountered, and then follows being’s self-construction through the Sollen, 
“illuminated for us as an absolute that holds and sustains itself out of itself, of itself, 
and through itself as such, on the condition that it exists [unter Bedingung, daß es 
sei].”79 The 1804 WL reproduces, while seeking to describe more amply, the same 
ontological structure as Fichte describes at the end of the Vocation. 
 Now it is of course true that all this belongs to a later phase in Fichte’s 
thinking, but the question is how much change or continuity should be seen in 
Fichte’s development. We should be reluctant to attribute to Fichte the volte face 
implied if we suppose him to have switched from one metaphilosophical view to its 
opposite.80 It is, I suggest, more plausible to regard Fichte as at least not fully 
committed in the Jena WL to the Non-Ontological conception – this is in any case, I 
                                                     
76 Fichte, 1800, pp. 107-10 [FW II, 299-302]. 
77 Fichte, 1800, pp. 110-11 [FW II, 302-4]. For an anti-realist reading of Vocation − as just practical 
postulation − see Breazeale, 2002, p. 194. Zöller, 1998, pp. 125-6, considers that the supra-individual 
will is “nothing else than” the moral law, and that its deification may be put down to the work’s 
popular presentation, but acknowledges that there is an “indication” of a “contemplative” stance 
towards the noumenal world (later developed by Fichte), which (I assume) Zöller regards as 
ontologically committed. Heimsoeth, 1923, ch. 5, gives a straightforwardly Ontological interpretation 
of Fichte’s Religionslehre, emphasising its immanentism and its departure from Kant’s postulate 
theory (pp. 176-7); Heimsoeth considers this motive to have been present, but unclarified, in the Jena 
WL (p. 194). See also Bourgeois, 1995, p. 103. 
78 Hegel, 1807, §599-631 [HW III, 441-63], “The moral view of the world,” esp. §§611-2, §616, §626, 
§§630-1 [HW III, 449-51, 452, 459-60, 461-3]. Hegel analyses the ontological commitment of moral 
consciousness in terms of consciousness’ attribution to its object of (a) “an intrinsic being of its own 
[Anundfürsichseiende]” (§616) [HW III, 452], “an existence and a reality [Dasein und Wirklichkeit],” 
“not as an unrealised “thought-thing”” (§630) [HW III, 461], which is (b) located “in another being 
than the actual consciousness” (§626) [HW III, 459]. We know (e.g., from Hegel, 1802, C., “Fichtean 
Philosophy”) that Hegel regards the Vocation as a central presentation of Fichte’s position. 
79 Fichte, 1804, pp. 131-2 [FW X, 227]. 
80 Vater, 1994, suggests that in 1801-02 Fichte under pressure from Schelling inconsistently 
compromises the WL by admitting transcendent “absolute being,” himself becoming a “Spinozist” (p. 
192). Yet if what I argue later is correct, this at most reflects a flaw in the 1801-02 presentation of the 
WL’s ontological dimension. 
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have argued, what the texts themselves suggest – and as having arrived at a definite 
view only in his post-Jena reflections.81 
 Much speaks in favour of this assessment. For instance, it is surely of 
significance that the 1804 view can be regarded as an attempt to explain what was 
meant a decade earlier in the obscure footnote in the Grundlage referred to earlier.82 
And in view of the point made earlier regarding the likely changed meaning of 
“postulate” in Fichte, it would not be surprising if Fichte’s commitment to the 
primacy of the practical failed to shake the WL free of ontological commitment. As 
noted, already in Kant there is the beginning of uncertainty as to what becomes of the 
practical/theoretical distinction through the moral theology, and there is additional 
reason to think that in Fichte the meaning of the distinction must alter. For, when 
Kant allows practical reason to declare that the ideas of God and the soul have 
objective reality, these ideas are still, so to speak, on loan from theoretical reason, and 
this gives force to the “merely” in Kant’s assertion that their objective reality is 
merely practical. But when Fichte makes practical reason fundamental and all-
encompassing, this is no longer the situation, and if the operations of Fichtean 
practical reason reveal a capacity to determine objects with genuine ontological 
status, in a way this is just what might have been expected. 
 2. The Wissenschaftslehre and metaphysics. Nothing yet argued affects the 
earlier point that a strong motive for reading Fichte Non-Ontologically appears to lie 
in the concern to do justice to Fichte’s insistence on the distinctiveness of the 
transcendental standpoint and to duly distance Fichte from any traditional “dogmatic 
metaphysics of the subject:”83 a distance which any Ontological interpretation of the 
WL − a style of interpretation characteristic, it may be thought, of older generations 
of Fichte commentators84 − may appear to reduce or eliminate. It needs now to be 
asked how much weight should be accorded to this motive. 
 (i) If the concern is to do justice to Fichte’s own perception of the distance, 
this can be accommodated by construing the difference between Fichte’s 
transcendental philosophy and traditional metaphysics, not in terms of the Non-
Ontological/Ontological distinction, but in methodological terms. On this view, 
Fichte’s characterisation of the metaphysics that, he affirms, Kant has forever 
disposed of, is methodological,85 and sets no limits on the content of transcendental 
philosophical claims: so long as the latter are arrived at in the right way, viz. by 
extrapolation from the transcendental conditions of empirical knowledge and moral 
will, and do not attempt to “produce an object by mere thought” or mere 
“argumentation,” their content may include ontological assertion regarding 
supersensible objects. Transcendental philosophy’s inventory of existents may thus 
overlap with that of traditional, pre-Kantian metaphysics, the difference between 
them, on this account, being that the latter has passed through the purgative 
methodological fires of Kant’s first Critique.  
                                                     
81 See Hartmann, 1923, pp. 80 ff., on the continuity in Fichte’s development. 
82 Fichte, 1794-95, p. 245n [FW I, 278n]. 
83 Zöller, 1998, p. 39. 
84 E.g., Martial Gueroult, or Heinz Heimsoeth. 
85 See Fichte, 1799, pp. 341-2 [FW V, 339-40], and Fichte, 1801, pp. 45-6 [FW II, 331-2].  
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 (ii) In so far as the aim is not so much to avoid landing Fichte with a 
generally pro-metaphysical position, but to avoid saddling him with the specific, 
especially objectionable metaphysical claim that there exists an absolute self (which 
gives birth to the world, etc., as per the standard caricature), it may be objected that 
this is to confuse two properly distinct issues. Fichte’s claim that the self posits itself 
as absolute sets of course a major interpretative challenge, but (quite apart from the 
question of whether it can receive a plausible Non-Ontological exegesis86) this is not 
well met by de-Ontologising the WL as a whole, a move that in fact concedes to the 
standard caricature precisely what should, arguably, be contested in it: namely its 
assumption that Fichte’s claim that the self “posits itself as absolute” can only have 
the kind of meaning that such a statement would have in pre-Kantian philosophical 
discourse. The problem with the standard caricature, it may be suggested, is not that 
its reading of Fichte is Ontological, but that it strips Fichte’s ontological claims of 
their distinctive post-Kantian sense and grounding. 
 (iii) To the extent that the worry is epistemological − the thought being that an 
ontological story is somehow less secure than a non-ontological − it appears 
misguided, for if the WL, under a Non-Ontological interpretation, has the 
epistemological warrant that it requires, then it must enjoy the same warrant under an 
Ontological interpretation; changing the status cannot of itself incur an 
epistemological penalty. As it might be put, if we know that the WL is the right story 
to tell, then why hold back from an Ontological interpretation? 
 (iv) To the extent that the worry about narrowing the gap between Fichte and 
traditional metaphysics has its source in a contemporary reconstructive motive of 
ours − namely to show that Fichte is on the same side of the fence as a sober 
naturalistic outlook in his opposition to metaphysics87 − it again appears wrong-
headed, in so far as the WL on a Non-Ontological interpretation (even one which 
holds the posited-being of nature to be compatible with realism) continues to 
contradict philosophical naturalism in a way that, although different from, goes every 
bit as deep as any ontological assertion of supernatural objects, by virtue of its 
committing Fichte to a conception of philosophical explanation that is unintelligible 
from the naturalist standpoint. 
 
6.  Internalising the Ontological/Non-Ontological distinction: Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel 
 
I hope to have indicated a limitation of what I take to be the most plausible Non-
Ontological interpretation of Fichte, and to have cast doubt on the supposition that a 
                                                     
86 On the issue of whether Fichte can and should be “freed” from ontological commitment to an 
absolute self, I am in agreement with Lachs 1987-88 in his criticism of Mandt, 1984, though Lachs’ 
own Ontological reading of the claim is not in my view optimal. Beiser, 2002, pp. 284-8, offers a more 
convincing Non-Ontological reading of the claim than Mandt, but continues to face a problem, in my 
view, concerning what it means to say that the self is, as Beiser puts it, “absolute only in a formal 
sense.” 
87 Even Zöller, whose interpretation of the WL is not Non-Ontological, endorses the impetus to avoid a 
“metaphysical reading” of Fichte, and talks of steering a “middle course” between naturalism and 
“supranaturalist metaphysics” (1998, pp. 38-9). 
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Non-Ontological reading is required in order to avoid a damagingly “metaphysical” 
interpretation of Fichte. I now suggest the following as an overall assessment of the 
WL’s status. 
 Fichte’s position does incorporate a Non-Ontological turn, in so far as he, 
inheriting Kant’s ambiguity regarding the status of the transcendental, and aware of 
how a non-ontological construal would furnish a solution to the problems posed by 
Schulze and Jacobi, sees what is to be gained by identifying philosophical 
explanation with the articulation of perspective, and accordingly employs the non-
ontological perspective of practical consciousness as transcendental ground. This 
could have resulted in a consistently Non-Ontological outlook and, had the WL been 
developed no further, would have done so. Fichte’s position is, however, not 
ultimately Non-Ontological: while Fichte considered a Non-Ontological conception 
of the transcendental sufficient to discharge at part of the task of philosophy, he did 
not regard transcendental explanation as necessarily Non-Ontological, and 
ontological characterisation of the transcendental is present, albeit in an imperfectly 
clear form, in the Jena writings, while in the post-Jena period − provoked by critics, 
above all Schelling and Jacobi, to rectify the WL’s appearance of ontological 
deficiency but in his own eyes simply following out the logic of his position − Fichte 
situates the transcendental perspective in a firmly ontological setting. This strategy 
gives Fichte a coherent and defensible position: having initially freed transcendental 
explanation from ontological commitments that made it vulnerable, Fichte is able to 
readmit ontological assertions in so far as they are strictly extrapolated from the 
initially uncommitted perspective; the fact that ontological assertion is reached in this 
indirect way, rather than “dogmatically” assumed to be possible ab initio, is what 
crucially allows Fichte to claim that in his hands systematic philosophy avoids 
Spinozism and gives reality to freedom, and that his metaphysics are genuinely 
Critical. To this extent at least, Hegel’s allegation that the WL amounts to a “ ‘whole 
nest’ of thoughtless contradictions” with respect to its ontological commitments 
appears merely to reflect a failure to grasp the complexity of Fichte’s position.88 
 There is a further element, of high importance, to be brought out in Fichte’s 
account of the status of the WL. Consider the following, very clear statement of his: 
 
The questions of whether the Wissenschaftslehre takes knowledge to be 
subjective or objective, and of whether it is idealism or realism, have no 
meaning; for these distinctions are first made within the W.L., not outside it, 
and not beforehand; and without the W.L. they remain unintelligible.89 
 
This, I suggest, provides the final key to understanding Fichte’s position regarding 
the Ontological/Non-Ontological issue. Fichte’s position must be that, in all 
strictness, no prior and independent description can be given of the status of the WL’s 
propositions: they cannot be qualified as “merely practical,” “merely regulative,” 
“mere postulates,” and so on; these descriptions have at most heuristic value, in so far 
                                                     
88 Hegel, 1807, p. 374 [HW III, 452]. 
89 Fichte to Schelling, 31 May 1801 [GA III, 5: 45-6]. 
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as they help induct us into the system. And this means that the question which we 
have been pursuing must be cancelled: if the very distinction of ontological from non-
ontological status is generated only within the WL, then it can make no sense to 
characterise globally the transcendental conditions specified in the WL as reflecting 
either an Ontological or a Non-Ontological conception of philosophical explanation. 
This would explain Fichte’s appearance of systematic ambiguity. And what Fichte 
means − in the fourth passage discussed in section 4.2, from the WL novo methodo 
lectures − by citing the WL’s identification of “real existence” with “necessary 
thinking” in answer to the question whether the WL’s transcendental grounds have 
ontological status, is simply that, in so far as our reflection on the acts postulated in 
the WL proceeds inside the WL, no gap can open up between the two, while from the 
external standpoint where the question is posed by such as Forberg, the distinction 
which the question presupposes has yet to be drawn.90 The answer to the earlier 
question of how we can conceive a unitary state of affairs incorporating an 
equivalence of “real existence” and “necessary thinking” thus lies in the self-
enclosing circularity repeatedly claimed by Fichte as a distinguishing virtue of the 
WL: in order to separate intelligibly “real existence” and “necessary thinking” at the 
highest level of reflection, it would be necessary to break out of the WL’s circle, 
which cannot be done. The question of whether or not, in talking of the positing of 
the absolute I, Fichte is also and thereby claiming “real existence” for the absolute I 
is accordingly dissolved, and merely reflects the distance that separates the 
transcendental from the ordinary and pre-Kantian standpoint, and the difficulty of 
articulating the former in terms that make sense to the latter. Finally, it is to be 
emphasised that the metaphilosophical structure just described, far from being itself a 
merely external, superadded gloss on the WL, is held to be immanent in pure 
“activity” − which is “higher than any being” in the sense of preceding the 
Ontological/Non-Ontological distinction. 
 Fichte’s debate with Schelling and Hegel accordingly appears in the following 
light. In the first place, Fichte and Schelling cannot be opposed to one another, as is 
often claimed, in terms of respective adherence to Non-Ontological and Ontological 
conceptions of philosophical explanation.91 What separates them is a finer issue. 
 If Fichte’s ultimate response to the question of Ontological/Non-Ontological 
status is, as suggested, that the distinction is properly internal to his system, then it is 
absolutely crucial that the system be truly “total,” that it have no thinkable “outside:” 
for if scope does remain, after the philosophical construction of the WL is completed, 
for thought of “real existence” apart from “necessary thinking,” then the question of 
Ontological/Non-Ontological status will not have been absorbed into Fichte’s system 
− it will be possible to step outside the WL and ask about its status, and the WL will 
not be immune from the doubt that its philosophical explanations express a mere 
perspective on being. 
                                                     
90 This interpretation is corroborated by the important passage in Fichte, 1798a, pp. 22-3 [FW IV, 16-
18]. See also Fichte’s rejection of Reinhold’s suggestion that the WL needs to explain itself in 
independent, external terms: Fichte to Reinhold, 4 July 1797 [GA III, 3: 71] (Fichte 1988, p. 421). 
91 Nor can Schelling’s philosophy be represented as a retrogressive departure from the properly 
transcendental project pursued in Fichte; see di Giovanni, 2005, p. 272. 
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 The claim of Schelling and Hegel is that, on account of the subjective bias 
of Fichte’s fundamental principle, the WL's claim to totalisation fails: its 
identification of real existence with necessary thinking is made only from a certain 
angle, while what is needed is a non-compromised identification of thought and 
existence from “no” angle. This criticism, set out at length in Hegel’s Differenz essay, 
is expressed succinctly in a letter of Schelling to Fichte: 
 
in order to preserve your system, one must first decide to proceed from seeing 
[Sehen] and to end with the absolute (that which is truly speculative), roughly 
in the same way that, in Kant’s philosophy, moral law must come first and 
God last for the system to remain in place. The necessity to proceed from 
seeing confines you and your philosophy to a thoroughly conditioned series in 
which nothing of the absolute remains to be met with.92 
 
Schelling’s point is that, even if it is granted that the ontologically uncommitted 
consciousness of the categorical imperative provides the correct model for conceiving 
consciousness or “Sehen” in general, and that the WL can be extrapolated from it, the 
(external) question arises how we are to think of this perspective. The question arises 
because Fichte’s claim for the absoluteness of the practical, ontologically 
uncommitted perspective is premised on an original setting aside of the ontological 
order: practical consciousness defines itself against the order of being (on a merely 
“immediate” basis, in Hegel’s language). The WL is thus premised on an original 
decision to take a non-ontological mode of consciousness, over and against 
ontologically-orientated consciousness, as our philosophical starting-point. To say 
this is not to disagree with Fichte, who acknowledges openly that a choice of starting-
point must be made but thinks that, for all of the powerful reasons given in the “First 
Introduction,” the rationality of his, the idealist’s, choice is beyond question. Still, 
even granting Fichte the argument of the “First Introduction,” what remains 
undischarged is the premise expressing a choice which it seems we must think of as 
conditioning the WL’s perspective. In relation to philosophical naturalism and other 
dogmatic alternatives to idealism (assuming the persuasiveness of the “First 
Introduction”) this represents no weakness. But it does, arguably, leave Fichte’s 
position open in principle to being improved upon: if it were possible to construct the 
system of philosophy in such a way that it could be regarded as encompassing at its 
very outset both Fichte’s ontologically uncommitted consciousness and the 
ontological order, excluding neither for the sake of the other, then his position could 
be regarded as overtaken.93 
 On this critical issue − of whether the WL is truly limited in a way that leaves 
it open in principle to being superseded − Fichte of course has much to say: it is his 
claim that the WL expresses the highest degree of absoluteness available for finite 
                                                     
92 Schelling to Fichte, 3 October 1801 [GA III, 5: 82]. 
93 Schelling’s alternative is to identify the transcendental with necessary being: what Fichte conceives 
as non-ontological perspective, on Schelling’s account, is but an expression of this being. With this 
Schelling can also claim to have answered Schulze, since if transcendental explanation refers to 
something that exists necessarily, then its ontological commitments cannot be problematic. 
 27 
reason and that any putatively higher principle relapses into a pre-Kantian 
Ontological conception.94 Adjudicating Fichte’s argument with Schelling and Hegel 
is extremely difficult, but for present purposes all that need be said is that it is 
doubtful that Fichte can supply a proof that any attempt to overtake the WL in the 
way described will be objectionably dogmatic,95 and to that extent the development 
of post-Fichtean German idealism is made intelligible in terms of the 
Ontological/Non-Ontological issue. 
 The endeavour in German idealism to provide a form of philosophical 
explanation that can claim to have internalised the Ontological/Non-Ontological 
distinction − to conceive transcendental grounds in a way which allows escape from 
vacillation between the two conceptions and avoids the objections to which each, 
when set in opposition to the other, is exposed − forms part of the German idealists’ 
attempt to resolve traditional metaphysical problems by transcendental means and to 
unite realism and idealism. The issue emerges again and again: it can be shown to be 
involved in the German Romantics’ criticism of and departure from the path taken by 
Fichte and Schelling; in Schelling’s theory of absolute identity as an ontological/pre-
ontological point of indifference, and in his associated complex distinctions of being, 
existence and ground; in Hegel’s chapter on the inverted world in the Phenomenology 
and his treatment of the concept of ground in the doctrine of essence; and it makes a 
final appearance in Schelling’s late criticism of Hegel.96 Kant’s ambiguity regarding 
the Ontological/Non-Ontological status of the transcendental is not quickly resolved 
but struggled over both within and between the German idealists’ positions; a single 
protracted debate extends from Kant’s Beweisgrund of 1762 to Schelling’s 
Abhandlung on the source of eternal truths of 1850.97 The incorporation of a Non-
Ontological turn, and the further attempt to resolve the Ontological/Non-Ontological 
metaphilosophical antinomy, is also, I have suggested, an important part of what 
makes the transcendental grounding of the world in German idealism appear, in a 
way that pre-Kantian metaphysics does not, an image of reality turned inside out.98 
 
                                                     
94 See e.g. Fichte to Schelling, 31 May 1801 [GA III, 5: 43-53] and Fichte, 1804, p. 30 [FW X, 101]. 
Fichte’s claim to incorporate, in uniquely coherent form, Schelling’s point of indifference is explicit in 
Fichte, 1804, Lecture 14. 
95 If Fichte supposes himself to have done so, this is because he mistakes Schelling’s attempt to sublate 
the Ontological/Non-Ontological opposition for a “dogmatic,” non-transcendental reassertion of the 
Ontological conception: see, e.g., Fichte’s remarks on System of Transcendental Idealism [FW XI, 
368-70], Fichte, 1804, p. 25 [FW X, 95], and Fichte, 1806, pp. 364, 366, 372. 
96 It is also resumed a century later in a different transcendental context, in the argument of Husserl 
and Heidegger. It is of interest that Heidegger tends to interpret Fichte Non-Ontologically (at one level 
at least) and regards Fichte’s position as defective in respects which recall his criticisms of Husserl: 
see Heidegger, 1929, e.g., pp. 56 ff., 139, 248, 251, and 1936-38, §§103-4. 
97 Schelling 1850, in which Schelling demonstrates the continuity of the Kantian issue with central 
questions of ancient and medieval philosophy. 
98 I am grateful to Peter Dews, Béatrice Han-Pile, Wayne Martin, Mark Sacks, Günther Zöller and 
others for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper presented at the Fichte Workshop as part 
of the Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism project, and to the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council and the Philosophy Department of University College London for research leave that enabled 
its completion. 
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